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INTRODUCTION
Q INCE the mid-1980's there has been an upsurge in the shipment of
hazardous wastes from industrialized countries to developing coun-
tries. The monitoring effort, organized by non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and particularly Greenpeace, identified more than 3.6
million tons of waste shipments from industrialized countries to develop-
ing countries between 1986 and 1988.1 West African countries imported
as much as twenty-four million tons of hazardous waste from industrial-
ized countries in 1988 alone.2 The United States produces more than 250
million tons of hazardous wastes each year;3 of that, 160,000 tons are
exported and the amount is increasing.4 The number of United States
companies that sought approval from the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), to export toxic wastes to developing countries increased
from twelve in 1980, to 638 in 1988.'
* The author is a J.S.D. candidate at the Stanford Law School. M.A. 1990, Tufts
Umversity, Fletcher School; L.L.M. 1987, Umversity of London, L.S.E. The author
wishes to thank Professor Dinah Shelton and Professor John Barton, Stanford Law
School, for their invaluable direction. The author appreciates the emotional support of
Mr. and Mrs. Paul Newton Okaru.
1. BILL MOYERS, GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN
HAZARDOUS WASTE 2 (1990).
2. International Trade in Hazardous Wastes Increases in 1988, University Professors
Say, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 74 (Feb. 8, 1989).
3. Waste Export Control Hearing on H.R. 2525 Before the Subcomm. on Transporta-
tion and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1989) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
4. Id. There is no accurate data on the quantity and quality of wastes that are actu-
ally exported to African nations. Additionally, surveys have confirmed that wastes are
not only exported to developing countries but also to developed countries. In 1989,
28,000 tons of waste were exported to Mexico from the United States, while 105,000 tons
of waste were shipped to Canada from the United States during the same period. Inter-
view with Jim Vincent, Coordinator for Waste Export Enforcement, EPA, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Dec. 12, 1990). Unlike other countries where wastes are exported, Canada
and Mexico have entered into bilateral agreements concerning the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and
the Government of Canada Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes, Oct. 28, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 593 (1987); Agreement of Cooperation between the
United States and the United Mexican States regarding the Transboundary Shipments of
Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, Nov. 12, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987).
5. James Brooke, African Nations Barring Foreign Toxic Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1988, at A18.
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But some officials of the EPA admit that many wastes exported to
developing countries are unaccounted for.6 Some exporters do not seek
approval from the agency; in turn, the EPA does not possess a very effec-
tive means of momtorng such shipments or ensuring that waste dealers
comply with the notification requirements.7
In addition, the statistics on waste exports from the United States do
not reflect the wastes that have yet to be formally categorized as "hazard-
ous" chemicals subject to regulation.' Most developing countries still
import banned, cancelled and unregistered chemicals including insecti-
cides at lower costs and in larger quantities from industrialized countries.
As a result, there is inaccurate data on the quantity and quality of all the
toxic substances exported.
Furthermore, there have been some reported incidents of the exporta-
tion of wastes without the formal consent of the importing government to
African countries, particularly to Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Le-
one, Congo, Liberia and Gabon. In 1986, two Americans, Jack and
Charles Colbert, were tried and sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment
in the United States for fraudulently selling 228 fifty-five gallon drums of
toxic chemicals, containing a mixture of recycled chlorne and solvents,
at $2.6 dollars per gallon to Chemplex Marketing, a Zimbabwean com-
pany, under the guise of dry-cleaning liquid.9
In an attempt to escape stringent legal means of protecting the envi-
ronment in the European Economic Community, on September 24, 1987,
an Italian businessman acting on behalf of Messers S.I. Ecomar, an Ital-
ian waste disposal company residing in Nigeria, was alleged to have ille-
gally exported 4,000 tons of toxic waste consisting of 150 tons of
polychlormated biphenyls (PCBs) from Italy to Nigeria over an eighteen
month period. 10 Thereupon, he made a profit of 4.3 million dollars."
The wastes were brought into the country as industrial chemicals for a
6. Congress intended the EPA to work closely with the United States Customs Ser-
vice, with the belief that a structured waste export monitoring system would be devel-
oped. See Robert M. Rosenthal, Comment, Ratification of the Basel Convention: Why
the United States Should Adopt the No Less Environmentally Sound Standard, 11 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 61, 70-71 (1992). However, monitoring procedures have been
ineffective as a result of a lack of resources and failure to have a comprehensive training
program in place. Id. at 71.
7. Andrew Portfield & David Weir, The Export of U.S.-Toxic Wastes, THE NATION,
Oct. 3, 1987, at 341. The United States Accounting Office concluded that the "EPA does
not know whether it is controlling 90% of the existing waste or 10% it does not know
if it is controlling wastes that are hazardous." From February to December 1987, the
EPA received 274 notifications of toxic waste exports, 143 of which did not show a port
of exit. Hearngs Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1988).
8. Id. These wastes include incinerator ash, banned and unregistered pesticides, used
batteries and scrap metals exported for recycling and containing hazardous wastes.
9. MOYERS, supra note 1, at 42.
10. Id. at 1.
1I. Louise Lief, Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1988,
at 55.
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Nigerian building construction company, Iruekpen. Mislabelling the
garbage as fertilizers, the Italian company deceived a retired/illiterate
timber worker into agreeing to store the poison in his backyard at the
Nigerian river port of Koko for as little as 100 dollars a month. 12 These
toxic chemicals were exposed to the hot sun and to children playing
nearby. They leaked into the Koko water system resulting in the death
of nineteen villagers who ate contaminated rice from a nearby farm. In
reacting to the toxic waste export, the Nigerian government severed dip-
lomatic relations with Italy and ordered the seizure of the Danish ship,
Damx, which transported the poisonous chemicals into the country
Moreover, the Italian merchant ship, M.V. Piave, was detained though it
was not involved in the alleged illegal shipment. Subsequently, diplo-
matic relations were renewed when the Italian government agreed to re-
import the wastes in return for the release of the Piave.13
Describing incinerator ash as building materials, in 1988, Gumomar, a
company jointly owned by Guinean and Norwegian governments, ex-
ported 15,000 tons of the toxic waste from Norway into the island of
Kassa in Guinea with the approval of the Guinean government. It was
not until trees started dying in the waste-affected areas that government
authorities discovered that the materials were actually toxic and immedi-
ately requested that the wastes be sent back to Norway. In 1988, 625
bags of falsely labelled toxic substances were dumped near Freetown, the
capital of Sierra Leone.14
In desperation, some companies have gone to the extent of attempting
to lure some African governments to accept toxic wastes by promising
some kind of economic reward. For example, an unnamed company had
unsuccessfully attempted to export toxic wastes to Liberia by promising
to build a hospital and supply drugs worth one million dollars in Liberia
if the latter accepted to import such wastes.15
In addition to importmg hazardous wastes, African countries, particu-
larly Ghana and Nigeria, have unknowingly imported toxic products, in-
cluding beef contaminated by the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the
Soviet Union in 1986.16
12. Illegal Traffic in Toxic Waste and Dangerous Products and Wastes: Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess. (1989). 100 dollars (1000 Nigerian naira) a
month was enough to induce the farmer.
13. Italy Moves to Resolve Problem with Nigeria on Dumping of Toxic Waste, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 379 (July 13, 1988); EC Rules on Waste Exporters Often
Ignored; Ministers Disagree on Tightening Standards, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at
375 (July 13, 1988). Reports revealed that the Nigerian Government arrested 40 officials
for conspiracy to bring the waste into country. Protests Made Over Docking of Ship Re-
turning Toxic Waste from Nigeria, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 526 (Oct. 12,
1988).
14. Jato Thompson, Laying Africa Waste, NEW AFRICAN, Sept. 1988, at 37.
15. Id.
16. Following the Chernobyl disaster, some European farmers found Africa a conve-
nient place to dump contaminated meat, milk and butter. Abdul Oroh, The Toxic Bug,
AFRICAN GUARDIAN, Dec. 4, 1989, at 22.
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The increase in legal and illegal traffic of wastes to African countries is
due to a number of reasons including:
-lack of available sites for the installation of toxic waste facilities m
industrialized countries;
-increased environmental awareness in industrialized countries result-
ing primarily in local opposition to toxic waste dump sites in their
neighborhoods;
-introduction of stringent government and legal regulations for the dis-
posal and management of toxic wastes in industrialized countries,
which measures are lacking in African countries;
-lack of effective means in industrialized countries of monitoring and
restricting toxic waste exports, particularly to African countries, and
simultaneously a lack of and/or shortage of required technical exper-
tise and infrastructure to inspect and to monitor the toxicity of the
wastes imported into Africa;
-economic incentives for foreign companies who are faced with costly
means of disposal in industrialized countries as opposed to cheap dis-
posal costs in African countries;
-financial inducement, particularly for those African nations that are
faced with heavy debts and are in dire need of foreign exchange;
-geological and demographic factors;
-lack of technical and regulatory means of reducing and preventing the
production of toxic waste.
With increased global industrialization, wastes are piling up faster
than there are places of disposal, particularly in industrialized countries.
The number of available disposal sites decreased from 1,500 in 1984 to
325 in 1988 in the Umted States, 7 where as much as 500 million tons of
wastes are generated each year.8 The difficulty m finding disposal sites
is aggravated by strong public resistance to the dumping of wastes in
their backyard or in any backyard. 9 Placement of wastes has become
very controversial even m low-income neighborhoods with low property
values, where companies believed that it was more economical to dispose
of toxic wastes and that residents of such areas were least likely to offer
any political resistance.20
Similar factors of economics and lack of resistance have influenced the
decision of compames to increase their exports to developing countries,
particularly to African countries where there is little effective environ-
mental regulation, economic instability, a high demand for foreign ex-
17. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, The Waste System 1-
20, (Nov. 1988).
18. MOYERS, supra note 1, at 104.
19. Most residents have prevented the construction of new facilities in their neighbor-
hoods, particularly in the United States. Gregg Easterbrook, Cleaning Up, NEWSWEEK,
July 24, 1989, at 27.
20. Residents of poor neighborhoods, mostly minorities, have formed organizations
to fight the dumping of wastes in their backyard and have accused both industry and the
U.S. government of environmental racism and class discrimination. Keith Schneider,
Minorities Join to Fight Polluting Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at A20.
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change and little or no public awareness of environmental hazards.2" In
addition, the intensified efforts to clean up old dumping sites represent an
additional build-up of hazardous wastes to be managed and disposed.22
The enactment of U.S. environmental statutes like the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) resulted in a large upsurge in the
price to bury and burn waste.23 Prior to the passage of RCRA, it cost as
little as $2.50 to bury a ton of waste and $50 to burn such wastes; subse-
quently, it increased to $200 to bury and over $2000 to burn.24
In African countries however, waste disposal costs for land filling are
as little as $2.50 per ton of hazardous waste. 25 Additionally, the costs of
administration, packaging, labelling, transportation and insurance are es-
timated at $100 per ton of waste exported to Africa from industrialized
countries,26 thus creating the economic incentive for companies to ex-
port. With little or no effective regulations for management and disposal
of wastes, African countries lack the technical expertise to momtor and
to control the wastes imported into their countries and to determine the
toxicity of such wastes. In addition, they lack the infrastructure and
technology needed to cope with the treatment and disposal of wastes and
have too many of their own hazardous waste problems to be able to cope
with importing wastes from other countries.
But with the poor state of economy in African countries, some have
admitted that they are sometimes financially induced to accept the ship-
ment of toxic wastes into their territories from the industrialized world.27
In 1988, European and American waste brokers offered Gumea-Bissau
$600 million to import fifteen million tons of industrial waste over a five
21. F James Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of Interna-
tional Legal Controls, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,171-72 n.3 (1989).
22. The United States enacted two statutes that regulate waste disposal. They are:
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 11002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
23. In 1976, Congress enacted RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992. RCRA was intended
to "eliminate the last remaimng loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land
disposal of discarded materials and hazardous waste." H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong.
2d Sess. (1976), repnnted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249.
24. The Garbage Industry: Where There's Muck There's High Technology, THE
ECONOMisT, Apr. 8, 1989, at 23. In other industrialized countries, particularly Europe,
it costs more than 2,000 dollars a ton to dispose of and to manage toxic wastes. Knut
Opsal, The Export of Toxic Waste to Africa, What Do You Know?, AFTEN, Sept. 1990, at
1. According to UNEP, the average cost of incineration in the United States rose from
$500 per ton of hazardous wastes in 1980 to $1,500 per ton in 1989.
25. The Philadelphia Deputy Commissioner, Bruce Gledhill, expressed the view that
there was nothing wrong with the shipment of incinerator ash to Guinea, Africa because
it was the best and least costly means of disposal. Knstin Helmore, Dumping on Africa,
West Exports its Industrial Wastes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1, 1988, at 1.
26. Harvey Yakowitz, Identifyng, Classifying and Describing Hazardous Wastes,
UNEP INDUS. & ENV'T, Jan.-Mar. 1988, at 3.
27. A top government official in Guinea-Bissau justified his country's acceptance to
import toxic wastes by stating, "we need the money." Harry Anderson, The Global
Poison Trade, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1988, at 66.
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year period. The total payment would have represented more than
thirty-five times the country's annual export earnings.2" But as a result
of pressure from other members of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), Guinea-Bissau, in June 1989, announced its intent to withdraw
from all the toxic waste agreements.29
Similarly, officials in Benin had signed a contract on January 12, 1988,
with SESCO, a British company based in Gibraltar to import between
one and five million tons of toxic waste at the price of $2.50 a ton.30 In
addition, SESCO promised to install a waste treatment plant free of
charge in Benin.31 Benin government officials entered into another con-
tract with a French company to dispose of nuclear waste from France.
However, during the OAU summit in May 1988, after enormous opposi-
tion and strong pressure from African countries, Benin officials canceled
their toxic waste contract with both the British and French companies.
Demographic and geological factors have prevented some industrial-
ized countries from building adequate disposal facilities and, as a result,
their desire to export to developing countries has increased. For exam-
ple, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg cannot afford to build complex
waste disposal sites due to their small size. The volume of hazardous
wastes are so considerable that such complex facilities are economically
inefficient. 32 Moreover, the Netherlands bans landfills because of its geo-
logical and hydrological conditions, including the high water table.33
In March 1988, in response to the international outcry concerning the
upsurge in hazardous waste movement into developing countries, the
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) sponsored the es-
tablishment of the Basel conference, consisting of 116 nations, to engage
in negotiations on the control of transfrontier movement of such
wastes.34 The conference was concluded in Basel, Switzerland in March
of 1989 with the adoption of the Basel Convention on the Control of the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste.35 The Convention was
the first attempt on a global scale to reach such an agreement. It consists
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Francois Misser, Africa: The Industrial World's Dumping Ground, AFRICAN
BUSINESS, July 1988, at 10. This contract granted SESCO the exclusive right to engage in
toxic waste export to Benin. The wastes were described as ordinary organic matters,
ordinary industrial waste and mineral waste. See Thompson supra note 14, at 36.
31. Thompson, supra note 14, at 36. SESCO emphasized that 200 jobs would be
created in Benin and that the country would earn four million dollars per annum. Impor-
tation of nuclear waste was not excluded from this contract.
32. See Handley, supra note 21.
33. Id.
34. Prior to the Basel Conference, concern about the exports of waste to other coun-
tries led to a UNEP sponsored resolution in 1987 known as the "Cairo Guidelines." Ad
Hoc Working Group of Experts on the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous
Wastes, U.N. Environment Programme, 3rd Sess. (1985), reprinted in 16 ENVTL. POL'Y
& L. 31 (1986). The Cairo Guidelines laid the groundwork for the global convention on
transboundary movement. Id.
35. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
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of the Final Act, resolutions, several declarations, the preamble and
twenty-nine Articles with six Annexes. The Basel Convention entered
into force on May 5, 1992.36 Presently, thirty-three countries have rati-
fied and are parties to the agreement.37
UNEP's goals m establishing the Basel Convention were to encourage
countries to introduce measures that would lead to major reductions in
the generation of wastes and ultimately, to eliminate their movement; to
make it difficult to get approval for the movement of hazardous wastes
with a view to reducing their transboundary movement; to only permit
its movement when it is environmentally sound to dispose of it afar
rather than close to where it was generated; and to clarify and enforce
measures to control the international trade in wastes.38
The aim of this Article is to discuss how effective the Basel Convention
will be in controlling the traffic of toxic wastes to African countries, par-
ticularly from the Umted States. Part I of the Article will examine the
content of some of the key provisions of the Basel Convention which may
hinder its ability to restrict and to momtor the export of toxic wastes to
developing countries, particularly African nations. In determining the
impediments to rigorous enforcement and implementation of the Con-
vention, Part II of the Article will analyze the relevant provisions, partic-
ularly those dealing with monitoring of the international waste trade,
enforcement and implementation. Finally, the Article offers conclusions
and recommendations which may further assist in the interpretation of
the Basel Convention and the problems associated with waste export.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE, DEFINITION AND CONTENT OF THE
BASEL CONVENTION
A. Hazardous Wastes
Radioactive wastes39 and garbage which derive from the normal oper-
ations of a ship4 are excluded from the scope of the Basel Convention.
The Convention defines "hazardous wastes" as all wastes stipulated in
and their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 [hereinafter Basel
Convention or Convention].
36. The Basel Convention provides that it shall enter into force on the nineteenth day
after the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval,
formal confirmation or accession. Id. art. 25.
37. The countries include Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary,
India, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Mexico, Monaco, Nigeria, Norway, Pan-
ama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and Uru-
guay. To enter into force, the Basel Convention requires only 20 countries to ratify the
treaty.
38. UNEP ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS UNIT, THE BASEL CONVEN-
TION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
AND THEIR DISPOSAL 4 (1990).
39. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. 3.
40. Id. art. 1, para. 4.
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Annex 141 and as any other wastes that are considered hazardous by the
domestic legislation of the party of export, of import, or of transit.42 The
wide definition was to prevent misunderstandings and contribute to a
better control and momtoring system. The Basel Convention was in-
tended to have flexibility to encourage political and scientific evolution of
the definition of hazardous waste.
Radioactive wastes were excluded from the scope of the agreement pri-
marily because these wastes are subject to other control systems and in-
ternational agreements. 43 Furthermore, unregistered, banned and
canceled chemicals including DDT (which are still heavily imported into
developing countries) do not belong to the category of hazardous wastes
that are specified in Annex 1 as "hazardous wastes" for the purposes of
the Convention.' However, such chemicals could be brought within the
scope of the Convention and could be considered "hazardous wastes" for
the purposes of the Convention if, in exercising the discretion accorded
to them, States enacted and implemented legislation to that effect.
45
However, given the financial incentive to import such poisonous pesti-
cides into Africa, the useful agricultural purposes served by the chemi-
cals and the lack of both knowledge of the toxicity of the pesticides
imported and access to alternative environmentally safe pesticides, Afri-
can countries would not effectively ban or control the importation of
such pesticides into their countries.46
Moreover, in industrialized countries, particularly the United States,
the environmental statutes47 do not prohibit the exportation of pesticides
41. Wastes enumerated m this annex include pharmaceutical products, biocides, or-
ganic solvents, cyanide, polychlormated biphenyls (PCBs), photographic chemicals and
chemical substances arising from research and development activities whose impact on
the environment and on the society are unknown.
42. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. l(b).
43. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
44. Chemicals such as DDT have been banned in most industrialized countries be-
cause they are considered poisonous to humans, ammals and the environment. Countries
that have banned these toxic chemicals include Canada, Japan, Sweden, the United King-
dom and the United States. NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY/ACTION TEAM
(NEST), NIGERIA'S THREATENED ENVIRONMENT, A NATIONAL PROFILE 20 (1991).
45. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. l(b).
46. In 1984, UNEP's governing council adopted two principles providing for infor-
mation exchange between exporting and importing countries of banned and restricted
chemicals. Provisional Plan for Information Exchange on Chemicals Recommended by
UNEP Council, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 180 (June 13, 1984). The first principle
required exporting countries to provide notification to importers when significant regula-
tory action was taken on a chemical, and the second suggested that exporting nations
should provide notification on exports following the control action when new information
was developed. Similarly, in the United States CERCLA establishes a mechanism to
monitor health impacts of hazardous wastes disposal and introduces a citizens "right to
know" provision requiring parties manufacturing or using hazardous materials to release
publicly any information about risks associated with a particular substance. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607, 9611, 11001-11050 (1988). Some African countries are partly to blame for im-
porting such chemicals, particularly those who are aware that the chemicals have been
banned in industrialized countries.
47. The Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) governs the
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whose registrations have been revoked, suspended or demed.4 s In 1984,
when the Umted States Congress amended the RCRA to include the reg-
ulation of hazardous waste exports to foreign countries,49 it did not cover
poisonous pesticides like DDT and Chlordane that had been banned for
use within the Umted States.50 Furthermore, other wastes in need of
regulation, particularly incinerator ash, infectious waste and muicipal
garbage, were excluded from the scope of the restrictive definition of the
Hazardous and Solid Waste Disposal Act (HSWA).5 1 As a result of the
narrow definition, a number of cases involving toxic waste exports are
not covered by the regulation.
Iromcally, the exportation of such poisonous wastes and chemicals to
developing countries has a boomerang effect on the environment and
human health in developed countries.52 Statistics prepared by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) confirm that about 10% of commodi-
ties imported into the Uited States from developing countries contain
illegal (banned and unregistered chemicals) residues of pesticides. 53 Ac-
cordingly, the Umted States imports more than two billion dollars worth
of agricultural products from other countries including those from devel-
oping nations that utilize banned hazardous wastes and pesticides im-
ported from the Umted States.54 There is a strong linkage between the
trade in hazardous wastes, and the environment and health of citizens in
registration, use and manufacture of pesticides. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-13 6y (1988). It is ille-
gal to distribute unregistered pesticides within the United States. Id. § 136j. However,
pesticides whose registrations were revoked, denied, suspended or never sought can be
exported freely by the manufacturer or distributor without any serious impediments. Id.
§ 136o(a). The condition that must be satisfied before exporting such unregistered pesti-
cides is labeling, to protect persons that come in contact with the product. Id. § 136o(b).
In addition, the exporters of pesticide products that are unregistered in the United States
must obtain a statement from the foreign purchaser acknowledging the registration status
of the product. Id. § 136o(a). This is an indirect way of informing foreign governments
that pesticides which are unregistered are being exported by United States producers.
48. Id. § 136o(c).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988).
50. The differences between RCRA and the Basel Convention have contributed to the
reluctance of the United States to ratify the treaty. RCRA defines hazardous waste
broadly as solid wastes which may "cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or serious illness; or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed
of, or otherwise managed." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
51. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
52. As early as the year 1979, the General Accounting Office identified that the
United States imported commodities (such as bananas, coffee, cacao, sugar and tea) from
developing countries (including India, Guatemala, Ecuador and Costa Rica) that indis-
criminately used banned and unregistered pesticides imported from the United States. In
using the multi-residue tests, the Food and Drug Administration was unable to detect
130 pesticides that were used, allowed and recommended in foreign nations for the culti-
vation of some crops including bananas, coffee, sugar, tomatoes and tea. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, BETTER REGULATION OF PESTICIDE EXPORTS AND PESTICIDE
RESIDUES IN IMPORTED FOOD IS ESSENTIAL, H.R. Doc. CED-79-43, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
53. H.R. 1686, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
54. Overview of Waste Export Activities: Hearings Before the Subconm. of Environ-
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both developing and developed countries. Therefore, since no country is
immune from the health and environmental problems that stem from the
indiscriminate export of toxic wastes, chemicals and dangerous pesti-
cides, it should be in the interest of both developing and developed coun-
tries to ensure that such wastes and poisonous chemicals are not
exported to developing countries without adequate institutional, financial
and legal capacity.
B. Disposal in an Environmentally Sound and Efficient Manner
Article 4 of the Basel Convention stipulates that hazardous waste ex-
ports will not be permitted if they are not managed in an "environmen-
tally sound manner." With regard to the standards to be applied in
ensuring that such wastes are managed in an environmentally sound
manner, the Convention defines "environmentally sound management of
hazardous wastes" as taking all practical steps to ensure that hazardous
wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect
human health and the environment against the adverse effects which may
result from such wastes." However, ambiguity is created by the failure
of the Convention to specify and clarify the meaning of practical steps.
56
Furthermore, the Convention provides that "the obligation of
States in which hazardous wastes and other wastes are generated to re-
quire that those wastes are managed in an environmentally sound man-
ner may not under any circumstances be transferred to States of import
or transit."57 Although the provision clearly infers that the State of ex-
port is responsible for safe disposal abroad, Article 4 is not clear as to
wich country's safety standards should be applied in the country of
import.
With inadequate infrastructure and utilities, ineffective regulatory
framework and financial incapacity in African countries, compames from
industrialized countries are sometimes hindered from rigorously apply-
mg stringent standards prevailing in their home countries in African
countries. But the practice of exporting wastes to countries with weaker
environmental policies and less stringent regulations constitutes a de
facto double standard. Taking into consideration the differences between
environmental standards in industrialized and developing countries,
there is a need to question whether such a double standard in environ-
mental protection should be acceptable or tolerable. 58 The consequences
of applying such a standard include less environmental protection for
ment, Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1988) (statement of
Bonnie Ram, Fellow, Energy and Environment, Federation of American Scientists).
55. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 8.
56. Dermot A. O'Sullivan, International Controls on Transport, Disposal of Wastes
Agreed Upon, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 3, 1989, at 21.
57. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 10.
58. International Export of U.S. Waste: Hearing Before the Subcornm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1988 (1989).
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those in the country of import resulting primarily in a higher risk of
environmental hazards for not only those in the country of import but
also those in other parts of the world including the country of export. 59
The notion of equity refers to the principle of treating all people equally
and in a just way despite the vaned cultural, social, scientific and eco-
nomic conditions in various countries.' Furthermore, such unethical
acts constitute a violation of Principle 23 of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment.61
However, there is evidence in international law to support the argu-
ment that the United States cannot force a domestic company to comply
with American law and standard in a foreign country In Fruehauf Corp.
v. Massardy,62 the court held that an American company doing business
in France must honor the contract regardless of the fact that it violated
United States Transaction Control Regulations. As a result, it may be
argued that U.S. companies involved in the trade with developing coun-
tries cannot be forced to apply U.S. environmental regulations in devel-
oping countries.
Furthermore, both industrial and developing countries are concerned
that if rigorous domestic environmental protection standards are estab-
lished, production costs will increase and the country that applied such
standards will be at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis nations with
lower standards. Developing countries justify the application of lower
standards for lesser developed countries than for highly industrialized
countries by asserting that they can hardly afford such environmental
services and with the low level of industrialization, they have not ex-
hausted the assimilative capacity of their environment.
But the development of an internationally uniform environmental
standard will not eliminate the competitive advantage based on differ-
ences among countries in environmental control costs. For example,
water quality standards depends on the level of industrial activity, the
composition of that activity (dirty or clean processes), the spatial disper-
sion of the activity and the topographical and climate conditions, all of
wich vary among countries. Therefore, instead of applying a uniform
international standard to all countries or no standards to developing
countries, environmental standards should be applied on a case by case
basis to industries within each country but based on a threshold estab-
lished by an international organization.
59. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
60. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE 8 (1987).
61. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420
(1972). Principle 23 provides that:
[I]t will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing m
each country and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for
the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwar-
ranted social cost for the developing countries.
62. 5 I.L.M. 476, 477-79 (1966).
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Besides the subject of applicable environmental standards, the question
of transfer of technology has been a subject of much controversy between
the industrialized and developing countries.63 Developing countries ar-
gue that they do not have access to adequate technology However, in-
dustrialized countries convincingly argue that developing countries can
not afford advanced technology or products of advanced technology.
Noting their limited administrative and technical capacities in evaluat-
ing, momtoring and controlling the international toxic trade, at the con-
ference several experts from developing countries stressed the need to not
only develop their own system of controlling the transboundary move-
ment of toxic wastes, but also to strengthen their capacity to manage
locally generated and imported wastes." Consequently, they succeeded
in incorporating into the Convention their idea with a view to provide an
incentive for reducing the generation of such wastes,65 and to discourage
the international trade in toxic waste and its transfrontier movement, and
to ensure the environmentally sound management of such wastes.66
Accordingly, the Basel Convention provides that:
[p]arties shall take the appropriate measures to ensure that the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes. only be allowed if: (a)
The State of export does not have the technical capacity and the neces-
sary facilities, capacity or suitable disposal sites in order to dispose of
the wastes m question m an environmentally sound and efficient
manner.
67
In addition, the Convention provides that "each party shall take ap-
propriate measures to: "[e]nsure that the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes and other wastes is reduced to the minimum consistent
with environmentally sound and efficient management of such
wastes... ,68
However, ambiguity is created by the use of the word "efficient" in
Article 4. For example, the increase in toxic waste dumping in develop-
ing countries was a response to the economics of waste disposal because
the cost of disposal m industrialized countries increased tremendously.69
Therefore, the word "efficient" may be interpreted as meaning cheaper or
more economical and would be used by some of these States to justify the
enormous increase of toxic waste exports to developing countries who are
63. RALPH H. FOLSOM, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS 662
(1986).
64. Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts with a Mandate to Prepare
a Global Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes, U.N. Environment Programme, at 5, U.N. Doc. WG.180/3 (Oct. 1987).
65. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 9(a).
66. Id. art. 4, para. 2(d).
67. Id. art. 4, para. 9(a). This section could be interpreted to mean that countries
which have the "technical capacity" such as industrialized nations should not engage in
transboundary movement of hazardous waste.
68. Id. art. 4, para. 2(d).
69. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
THE BASEL CONVENTION
not technologically advanced enough to handle them. The provision is
paradoxical because it is contrary to one of the motives behind the for-
mulation of the Convention, namely to restrict the transfrontier move-
ments of these wastes, particularly to such developing countries and to
ensure proper disposal and management of hazardous wastes.
C. Waste Management versus Waste Prevention
It would appear that the prevention and reduction of the production of
toxic waste is far more efficient than the management of such wastes.
Evidence from surveys conducted between 1985 and 1986 of U.S. chemi-
cal plants by the Office of Technology Assessment7° revealed that mdus-
tries have found it beneficial and efficient to reduce the amount of wastes
produced.71 Yet, during the Basel Conference, States focused primarily
on waste management and disposal and failed to emphasize the need for
the development of scientific research and techmcal support to reduce
and to prevent the generation of toxic wastes and for legal means of
preventing the production of such wastes.72 Furthermore, the Conven-
tion is vague as to the degree to which wastes should be reduced and as
to the method of garbage reduction.73 As long as inexpensive means of
disposal alternatives are available, there will be little incentive to find and
explore new directions, such as reducing wastes at their source.74 Since it
has been determined that the cost of hazardous waste management is
often higher than the cost to prevent waste production, policies based
solely on waste management are not sustainable. A sustainable hazard-
ous waste program should stress reducing both the volume and toxicity
of waste to the minimum level possible and should include programs for
recycling and reuse.
From the standpoint of the hard core environmentalist, the optimal
level of pollution should be zero. On the other hand, environmental
economists convincingly assert that the optimal level of pollution should
be determined by comparmg the costs associated with pollution with the
benefits derived from the commodity whose production causes pollu-
tion.75 The optimal level of pollution occurs when the marginal pollution
70. UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SERI-
OUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES (1986).
71. Id. at 8. An Oluo company, USS Chemicals which produces a wide range of
chemicals was able to save about U.S. $100,000 in raw material costs by reducing air
emissions by 400,000 pounds per year. MOYERS, supra note 1, at 110.
72. The Basel Convention addresses the need to decrease waste production by calling
on parties to "ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes is
reduced to a minimum." Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 2(a).
73. The Convention does not expressly stipulate that increased generation of wastes
over the past decade has contributed to environmental degradation and that the trend of
unsustainable development should be reversed.
74. Current control strategies are designed to manage the wastes produced rather
than to avoid producing such wastes. Joanna D. Underwood, Managing hazardous
wastes is not enough, UNEP INDUS. & ENV'T, Jan.-Mar. 1988, at 30.
75. STEPHEN D. CASLER, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 377 (1992).
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costs equals the marginal pollution benefits. Pollution is a by-product of
producing certain goods and services that provide utility to and are heav-
ily demanded by consumers. If such goods and services associated with
pollution were not heavily demanded by buyers, they would not be pro-
duced. Moreover, the prevention and reduction of wastes would entail
some changes in the nature of goods and services provided to shoppers.
Therefore, without a change in consumption patterns of customers and
without the implementation of stringent regulatory measures, some profit
making industries and producers would not have a strong incentive to
prevent and reduce the production of wastes.
Therefore, in addition to conducting more scientific investigation on
alternative waste prevention and reduction techniques, there should be
more intensive research on and rigorous implementation of regulatory
and economic means of inducing a change in consumption patterns of
consumers and of providing economic incentives for compaies to reduce
and prevent the production of such wastes.76 While improving their own
waste reduction and prevention techniques through scientific investiga-
tion, industrialized countries should assist developing countries in techm-
cal matters and training related to such techniques.
D. Sovereign Right to Ban versus Right to Limited Ban
In emphasizing the gap in disposal technologies and environmental in-
frastructure between industrial and developing countries, African coun-
tries proposed a total ban as opposed to a limited ban recommended by
76. For example, economic instruments that have been used in mducmg consumers to
reduce the amount of garbage generated include user charges, disposal charges, produc-
tion charges, subsidies, deposit refund systems, and a variable garbage rate structure.
Deposit refund systems impose special taxes and fees on consumers and are designed to
encourage recycling and to prevent pollution. They are often applied to beverage bottles.
In the United States, ten States have executed mandatory deposit refund systems. The
States that have implemented these deposit systems report that 80% to 95% of deposit
containers are returned voluntarily for recycling. The economic incentive, five or ten
cents per container, is sufficient to produce the desired consumer behavior. See JOHN L.
MOORE ET AL., USING INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AN OVER-
ViEW (Congressional Research Service 1989). Most product charges on waste have ap-
plied to nonreturnable containers, lubricant oils, plastic bags, fertilizers, pesticides,
beverage containers and car fuels. Finland imposes high fees on non-returnable beverage
containers while France charges fees on lubricants. In the United States, and particularly
in Seattle, Washington, the "variable garbage waste structure" was implemented in Janu-
ary 1989. The waste reduction program charges residents according to how many gar-
bage cans they fill. When citizens reduce the number of rubbish cans, they are rewarded
with a lower solid waste collection bill. The basic rate structure is that one 30-gallon can
collected each week costs $13.75 per month and each additional 30-gallon can costs
$9.00. Following implementation of the program in 1989, monthly waste collection
plummeted by about 30% in comparison with the prior year. See Janis D. Bernstein,
Urban Waste Management and Environment, Alternative Approaches to Pollution Con-
trol and Waste Management: Regulatory and Economic Instruments 56 (Apr. 1991)
(discussion paper, on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Report).
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industrialized countries." The knowledge that foreign countries were
using African territory as a dumping ground for hazardous wastes gener-
ated a strong reaction from African countries. In May 1988, the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution condemning this
activity and called for a ban on the importation of wastes into the Afri-
can continent.78 Disillusioned with the outcome of the Basel Conven-
tion, the OAU drafted the African Convention on the Ban on the Import
of All Forms of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Such Wastes Generated in Africa.79 Frustrated
by a series of tragic toxic waste incidents in their countries, African
countries wanted to focus primarily on the total prohibition of the trade
rather than on its regulation because they believed that a limited ban
would imply legitimizing and acknowledging the right to engage in such
a trade. Moreover, legalizing the business would allow for abuses of that
right and would increase the financial inducement of African countries to
import such wastes.
In support of the position taken by developing countries, a coalition of
NGOs, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, International
Organization of Consumers Unions, Greenpeace and the African Net-
work of Environmental NGOs called for an outright worldwide ban on
the transboundary toxic trade.8 0 Condemning the transfrontier move-
ment of toxic waste to developing countries, and stressing that these
countries have had enough difficulties in coping with wastes generated
locally that they cannot afford to import, the President of the World
Bank stated that the organization would not finance any activities con-
nected with such hazardous waste exports to African nations."' How-
ever, he also stated, that the World Bank would support developing
countries in their effort to strengthen their own institutional capacity and
domestic facilities for effective waste management through recycling, re-
covery and safe disposal.8 2
77. Alexandre Kiss, The International Control of Transboundary Movement of Haz-
ardous Waste, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 521 (1991).
78. Id. at 527.
79. The OAU members subsequently convened in Bamako, Mali and adopted the
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of the Trans-
boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa. See Kiss,
supra note 77, at 533 n.101. The Bamako Convention is stricter than the Basel Conven-
tion, although its provisions are very similar to those in the Basel Convention. Id. at 533.
The Bamako Convention prohibits and cnminalizes the importation of any waste for any
reason into Africa from non-contracting parties. It also provides for the cooperation and
the creation of an enforcement mechanism. Id.
80. UNEP Transboundary Transport Draft Bogged Down Over Prior-Consent Issue,
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 660 (Dec. 14, 1988).
81. Barber Conable's, Address at the Conference on Sustainable Development (July
9, 1988). Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts with a Mandate to
Prepare a Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes, U.N. Environment Programme, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 6 at 5, U.N. Doc.
WG.189/3 (Nov. 1988) (statement by the World Bank Representative).
82. Id.
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Arguing that a complete ban would be difficult, if not impossible to
enforce, most industrialized countries proposed a partial prohibition of
the toxic trade. Additionally, most delegates from developed countries
asserted that an argument based solely on ethical considerations was not
sufficient to warrant the total ban of the toxic trade and to prevent a
country from engaging in exports, particularly if the country of import
voluntarily accepts such wastes. In support of the view expressed by del-
egates from industrialized countries, Robert Krieps, the Luxembourg
Mimster of Environment, Justice and Cultural Affairs, addressing the
delegates at the Fourth Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group, 83 pointed
out that an effort to stop the shipment of toxic waste overnight through a
total ban would not only be fruitless but would lead to an outgrowth of
illegal markets. However, he stressed the need to put an end, through a
gradual process, to the trade which he candidly classified as "waste
colonialism. '8 4
In favor of the view that toxic waste exports to developing countries
should not be totally prohibited, a chief economist of the World Bank
put forth a purely economic argument that the World Bank should en-
courage larger migration of dirty industries to developing countries be-
cause health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the
lowest cost and the lowest wages and that the costs of pollution are likely
to be non-linear as the initial increase in pollution would most likely have
a very low cost, particularly in underpopulated countries in Africa that
are under-polluted. 5
There is a convincing economic argument that a total ban on the toxic
trade, like the ban on commodities, may make the wastes more attractive
in the international market and consequently result in smuggling. For
example, in 1988, when the Nigerian Government introduced a ban on
the importation of goods such as rice with a view to improving the agri-
cultural sector, there was an increase in smuggling from neighboring
countries like Ghana coupled with elevated prices of such commodities.8 6
However, despite this effect that the total prohibition may have on the
attractiveness of the toxic trade, African countries are still justified in
insisting on being accorded the right to ban such a trade especially as
they lack the financial and institutional capacity to monitor such activity
With industrialization and population growth, wastes are piling up faster
83. Ad Hoc Workng Group of Legal and Technical Experts with a Mandate to Pre-
pare a Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes U.N. Environmental Programme, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 6, at 2-3 U.N. Doc.
WG.190/4 (1989).
84. Id. at 3.
85. See Lawrence Summers, Let Them Eat Pollution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992,
at 66. It should be noted that there are ethical, moral, legal and social arguments against
the views expressed in the article. Particularly, Summers ignores the need for more em-
phasis on sustainable growth and development in African countries and for adequate
means of waste disposal, management, prevention and reduction in all parts of the world.
86. DAVID A. IYEGHA, AGRICULTURAL CRISIS IN AFRICA: THE NIGERIAN EXPE-
RIENCE 142 (1988).
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in developing countries and, as such, they have enough difficulties with
managing their own locally generated wastes that they can hardly afford
to cope with wastes from other countries. Besides, a global ban would
put more pressure on industrialized countries to speed up their efforts to
develop alternative toxic waste reduction and prevention technology.
Accordingly, the Basel Convention recognizes and incorporates van-
ous aspects of dealing with the international toxic trade problem includ-
ing economic, social, and ethical considerations of both developed and
developing countries. African countries succeeded in ensuring the recog-
intion of their right to ban the toxic trade 7 while industrialized countries
succeeded in incorporating a limited ban of the trade including the Arti-
cles requiring "prior informed consent" and "notification" before export-
ing such wastes." Each State party to the Convention was granted the
sovereign right, recognized by all States, to prohibit the importation of
such wastes into their country 89 Based primarily on a proposal by the
African delegates, 90 the Convention prohibits the exportation of toxic
wastes to those countries that have prohibited its importation into their
territories. It provides that "[p]arties shall prohibit or shall not permit
the export of hazardous wastes and other wastes to the parties which
have prohibited the import of such wastes." 91
Concerned about the effect the Basel Convention might have on their
regional agreement banning the importation of toxic waste, members of
the OAU successfully added provisions to the Convention that would
protect regional interests.9' On banning the importation of wastes, State
87. Although the Basel Convention prohibits the exportation of hazardous wastes to
countries that have banned its importation, it failed to expressly categorize such acts as
illegal in accordance with Article 9 which defines illegal traffic. Despite such failure, it
can be argued that such acts are illegal, being in contravention of the Convention. See
Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 9(e).
88. Additionally, the trade was made subject to a number of restrictions and controls
under the Convention. Id. arts. 4, 6 and 9.
89. Id. art. 4, para. i(a)-(b).
90. Ad Hoc Working Group ofLegal and Technical Experts with a Mandate to Prepare
a Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste,
U.N. Environment Programme, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doe. WG.189/3 (1988).
The delegates successfully recommended that the movement of hazardous wastes be pro-
hibited to or through the territories of States or regions which had either enacted national
laws or adopted regional instruments prohibiting such movements to or through their
territories. In addition, they proposed preparing a register, which would be updated pen-
odically, listing the states which have banned the toxic trade. Id. at 5.
91. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 4(b).
92. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 2(e). The Article prohibits:
the export of hazardous wastes or other wastes to a State or group of States
belonging to an economic or political integration organization that are parties,
particularly developing countries, which have prohibited by their legislation all
imports, or if it has reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be
managed in an environmentally sound manner, according to criteria to be de-
cided on by the Parties at their first meeting.
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parties are required to inform other States93 and the Secretariat 94 about
this decision.
Supporting a limited ban on the international trade m toxic wastes,
industrialized countries, particularly the United States, successfully
pushed for "a prior informed consent" provision 95 and the "notification"
provision 96 as alternatives to a total ban, primarily because they believed
that there was nothing illegal about engaging in the trade if the importing
country was fully informed of any hazards.97
Accordingly, the Convention provides:
that the generator or exporter shall notify in writing the competent
authority of the State concerned of any proposed transboundary move-
ments of hazardous wastes. Such notifications shall be in writing in
a language acceptable to the State of import.98
Furthermore, the Convention requires that parties "shall prohibit or
shall not permit the export of hazardous wastes and other wastes if the
State of import does not consent m writing to the specific import. "91
The prior informed consent procedure is designed to assure that no
wastes are being exported to countries whose governments are unaware
of the toxic transaction. The presumption was that if a government of an
importing country was aware of the importation, they would ensure safe
disposal.
Furthermore, the notification and consent provisions were intended to
give the importing government tine to halt unwanted shipments, to pre-
vent waste smuggling and to discourage unscrupulous and secretive tran-
sfrontier movement of hazardous wastes. Some countries have taken
advantage of the prior informed consent rule in bilateral agreements by
refusing to import toxic wastes from the Umted States. The EPA re-
ported that Mexico accepted only 30,000 tons out of 230,000 tons of
waste proposed for shipment from the United States in 1987."
E. State Responsibility Under International Law and the Basel
Convention
To ensure effective control and restriction of the trade in the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes, the Basel Convention stipu-
lated that international waste trade would be declared illegal without the
satisfaction of a number of conditions. For example, pursuant to the Ba-
93. Id. art. 4.
94. Id. art. 13, para. 2(d).
95. Id. art. 4, para. 1(c).
96. Id. art. 6, para. 1.
97. Knstin Helmore, Dumping in Africa: West Exports Its Industrial Wastes,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1, 1988, at 1.
98. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 6, para. 1.
99. Id. art. 4, para. 1(c).
100. Philip Shabecoff, Irate and Afraid, Poor Nations Fight Efforts to Use them as Toxic
Dumps, N.Y. TiMEs, July 5, 1988, at C4.
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sel Convention, a transboundary movement of toxic waste which takes
place under any of the following circumstances shall be deemed illegal:
-without notification in accordance with the Convention, to all States
concerned; 101
-without consent obtained from States concerned, through falsification,
misrepresentation or fraud;102
-that does not conform mn a material way with the documents; 10 3
-that results in deliberate disposal of hazardous wastes or other wastes
in contravention of this Convention and of the general principles of
international law. i04
In addition, the Convention stipulates that any transboundary movement
of hazardous wastes contravening the general principles of international
law shall be deemed illegal."iO Illegal traffic is criminal under the Basel
Convention. 106
An indirect approach has been taken in accordance with customary
international law and some international agreements whereby States are
obliged to take action to prevent persons under their jurisdiction from
violating pollution standards. The problem with the indirect approach is
that if a State were to exercise "due diligence" in enacting pollution con-
trol measures, the State may be seen as having discharged its interna-
tional obligations, regardless of any "deliberate damage" actually caused
by one of its nationals. 107
A more direct approach imposes State responsibility without the re-
quirement of showing proof of State involvement m the polluting activ-
ity, either through an act or an omission. The determination of State
responsibility is made simply by reference to observation of an act that
violates internationally accepted pollution standards.
To create a solid justification for the doctrine of strict liability in inter-
national law, distinguished publicists"i0 have turned to the decisions of
international tribunals. 109 International jurists have put forth convincing
arguments that these cases point to the emergence of strict liability as a
principle of public international law 110 The opinions in these cases rec-
ognize the applicability in international law of such related common law
101. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 9(a).
102. Id. art. 9(b).
103. Id. art. 9(c).
104. Id. art. 9(d).
105. Id. art. 9(e).
106. Id. art. 4, para. 3.
107. CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
213 (1928).
108. See JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TO-
WARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, 163-67 (1979).
109. Particularly, the Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.
Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949); and Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
110. L.F.E. Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 306-09 (1970).
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principles as good neighborliness. 1" Moreover, the cases provide sup-
port for the basic rule that a State is responsible for all activities taking
place within its territory and may be held liable should damage caused to
the interests of other States reach pollution threshold, even if the State
has done all it could to prevent the injury It is illegal for states to use or
permit the use of their territories for acts that would constitute harm to
persons or to the environment in other countries. 1 2 For example, the
Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada held
that under the rule of international law and the law of the Umted States,
no State has the right to use or allow the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes to property, or persons in another
territory when the case is of serious consequence and when the injury is
established." 3 The holding in the Corfu Channel case reinforces the
principle in Trail Smelter and broadens the doctrine of State responsibil-
ity to instances where countries have omitted to act or to prevent the act
in their territory. 14 Similarly, Principle 21 of the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Human Environment provides that States have a sovereign
right to exploit their resources in accordance with their environmental
policies and the corresponding responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' Effective
implementation of the strict liability rule requires willingness and cooper-
ation on the part of States. The debate over the adoption of Principle 21
revealed that though States agreed in theory to accept the responsibility
to prevent extraterrtorial damage caused by activities under their con-
trol, it was impossible to reach agreement on the content of the responsi-
bility should damage occur. 116 Many States were not prepared to pay
compensation in as many situations as the rule of strict liability would
require and some States preferred a form of "fault" standard in which
liability would attach only to "negligence of a state, imputable either to
inaction or the failure to fulfil specific commitments."' 7 Industrialized
states with large investments in polluting industries and developing coun-
tries who are anxious to retain maximum control over economic affairs
within their respective territories are concerned about attempts to create
any general liability regime that requires what may amount to substantial
111. Id.
112. The facts of these cases are not on all fours with the transfrontier movement of
hazardous wastes. But like the international traffic in toxic waste, the cases involve acts
in one State which injure persons or property in other States. Therefore, the principles
laid down in these cases could apply to the international toxic trade.
113. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1949), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1949).
114. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
115. Lous B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14
HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 485 (1973).
116. Id. at 493-94.
117. Id. at 495.
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payments for extraterritorial damage done by activities legally controlled
by their respective countries.
Whether or not strict liability has emerged as a general principle of
international law in environmental matters, there is some evidence that it
is increasingly evident in State practice."1 "
Likewise, the Basel Convention seems to impose responsibility on the
State of export for acts committed by persons within its jurisdiction or
control. For example, the Convention provides that:
in case of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes deemed to be
illegal traffic as a result of conduct on the part of the exporter or gener-
ator, the State of export shall ensure that the wastes in question are:
(a) taken back by the exporter or generator or, if necessary by itself
into the State of export 119
In addition, the Convention imposes a responsibility on the State of ex-
port to re-import if the transboundary movement was illegal ab mnitio.
120
The provision clarifies the issue of responsibility for illegally exported
waste. By requiring that exporters would have the responsibility to re-
cover the wastes rejected elsewhere, Article 9 of the Convention was in-
tended to effectively put pressure on the exporting State to try to police
their shores more carefully. This would also help to reduce illegal traffic
and to alleviate some of the complications resulting from situations
where unsuccessful attempts are made to dump toxic wastes in different
territories. 121 An example of this problem was illustrated by the ship
"Kluan Sea," which carred 14,000 tons of incinerator ash from Philadel-
phia. The ship's cargo was rejected in a number of countries including
Honduras, Bahamas, Bermuda, Panama and Guinea-Bissau. Conse-
quently it sailed to Haiti, where it was finally ordered to leave after un-
loading about 3,000 tons of ash.1 2 2 This was only the beginning of an
eighteen month voyage that took the ship across the Atlantic around
West Africa and the Pacific. In desperation, the owners, a waste disposal
company named the Amalgamated Shipping Corp., changed the ship's
name to "Felicia" in Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast and sold it to Romo
Shipping Inc., a waste disposal and shipping company Romo unsuccess-
118. Strict liability was adopted in 1969 by the Consultative Assembly of the Council
of Europe in a draft convention on water pollution. See Draft European Convention on
the Protection of Fresh Water Against Pollution, Adopted by Recommendation 555 (1969)
by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe May 12, 1969 reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 5748, 5745-55 (Bernd Ruster et al. eds.,
1977). Although the draft convention was rejected by European governments, because it
permitted private foreign parties to sue States directly, the agreement is a manifestation of
the willingness of States to extend the application of strict liability to activities other than
those normally termed "ultrahazardous" and is a step towards enhancing the effective-
ness of liability regimes.
119. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 9.
120. Id.
121. Helmore, supra note 97.
122. Joseph Paulino & Sons v. Amalgamated Shipping Corp., No. 87-1777, 1989 WL
79743, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1989).
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fully attempted to dock m Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines. The
ship was renamed "Pelicano" after which it appeared in Singapore in
November 1988, without its poisonous cargo and no one knew exactly
where it had dumped its waste.123
The captain demed having dumped the wastes at sea, but refused to
say where he had unloaded the cargo."2 Philadelphia (named as the
original waste producer) denied legal responsibility, claiinmg that it en-
tered into a "good faith" contract with the waste disposal firm Joseph
Paulino & Sons and submitting that the issue was between that firm and
the compames that it hired. The argument, primarily based on ethical
grounds, against Philadelphia for contracting with Paulino to dispose of
its waste was not sufficient to hold the city responsible - especially if the
city acted in good faith. However, following the principle laid down in
international law, particularly Corfu Channel, it can be convincingly ar-
gued that in knowing how dangerous its toxic waste was and the diffi-
culty it had experienced in attempting to dispose of such wastes, the city
of Philadelphia must have foreseen the possibility that the wastes would
be disposed of outside Philadelphia and was obliged to ensure that the
company dispose of such wastes in an environmentally sound manner.
The doctrine of strict liability, if enforced internationally, could be ap-
plied to hold the city of Philadelphia liable without fault for wastes ex-
ported to developing countries.
Article 9 of the Convention is ambiguous as to whether or not the
exporting State should apportion responsibility among participating
compames. This uncertainty could allow a State to have the discretion to
decide whether it wants to force a liable company to pay compensation
for illegal traffic or to do it itself and then seek indemnity
The Convention provides that the parties shall cooperate with a view
to adopting, as soon as practicable, a protocol setting out appropriate
rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation for dam-
age resulting from the transfrontier movement of wastes.12 5 This provi-
sion is consistent with Principle 22 of the United Nations Declaration on
Human Environment, which provides that States should cooperate to de-
velop further international law regarding liability and compensation for
the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by ac-
tivities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction. 126
However, the Basel Convention was weakened at the time of its adop-
tion by the failure of State parties to set out such appropriate rules and
procedures. Without effective sanctions and provisions for liability, the
123. MOYERS, supra note 1.
124. Edward Cody, 105 Nations Back Treaty on Toxic Waste Shipping, Pact Seeks to
Shield Third World States, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1989, at 1.
125. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 12.
126. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420
(1972).
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Convention acts more like a code of conduct. In addition, State parties
to the Convention failed to adopt a civil liability regime like that of CER-
CLA.12 7 Industrialized countries, particularly the Umted States, blocked
the proposal of developing countries to adopt a strict regulatory regime,
such as that of CERCLA, 12 s which would have required retrospective
liability for companies that had illegally disposed of wastes in African
countries. The proposed "international superfund" provision was in-
tended to hold such companies liable to clean up their abandoned waste
disposal sites in Africa.
With a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention in con-
trolling the toxic trade, the first working group of Legal and Technical
Experts met in Geneva in 1990 to develop elements which nught be in-
cluded in a Protocol on liability and compensation for damage resulting
from the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. Matters to be
covered were divided into the following sections: introduction of the
scope of the liability protocol, civil liability and compensation and inter-
national liability and compensation and procedures.129
The liability regime, wlch is currently being drafted, addresses civil
liability for illegal traffic in hazardous wastes. The draft provides for the
exclusion of incidents specifically covered by international or regional in-
struments on liability, and compensation with regard to land, air or mari-
time transport of hazardous wastes, noxious substances or the dumping
of waste at sea.
The proposed draft excludes from within the scope of the liability pro-
tocol, claims falling solely within the national jurisdiction of a State party
and thereby resulting in a demal of redress under international liability
regime to a victim of damage caused by transboundary movement of haz-
ardous wastes. This demal constitutes an mjustice to the victim espe-
cially in developing countries where procedural delays in courts are very
common and the law of torts is not yet developed. Strict liability was
made subject to a number of exonerations, including acts of armed con-
flict and of civil war and unforseeable natural phenomena of an excep-
tional character. No exonerations were permitted for illegal traffic under
the Convention. Some delegates supported channelling liability as a gen-
eral rule to the generator except where a disposer duly authorized to
127. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The common law courts have inter-
preted CERCLA's liability scheme to imply that Congress intended to employ the com-
mon law concept of joint and several liability. The common law system allows a court to
impose joint and several liability on a case-by-case basis where such liability will further
the statutory purpose of making available responsible parties financially liable for the
entire cleanup. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F Supp. 802, 807-08 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). CERCLA adopted the polluter pays principle which imposes strict liability
on the polluter for all environmental and public health costs associated with a hazardous
substance. A polluter is any party that has a financial share in the hazardous substance.
ROBERT V PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 41 (1992).
128. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 38, at 26-27.
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receive the wastes has taken charge of them. Others supported allocating
liability to any person responsible for transfrontier movement or disposal
of wastes, based on joint and several liability. There is no statute of limi-
tations for filing claims for illegal traffic.
Basel Convention members met again in March 1991 to discuss other
elements that might be included m the document, particularly mterna-
tional liability and compensation. 130 Part two of the draft protocol to the
Convention provides that an international liability regime should ensure
that resources are available for prompt action in case of damage resulting
from illegal traffic and are adequate for compensating the victim to the
extent that compensation for such damage for civil liability is inadequate
or not available.1 31 The international liability fund was established in
accordance with Article 14 of the Convention. 132 Moreover, the State is
to provide compensation for damage to the extent that it (compensation)
is inadequate or not available under the civil liability provision and/or
from the international liability fund.
Concerned about the limited financial and technical capacity of the
international fund to function effectively, the member States proposed
the incorporation into the protocol a means to generate operating funds.
Member States provided that the international fund should be financed
by appropriate levies from persons involved in the generation, trans-
boundary movement and disposal of toxic waste such as generators, ex-
porters, importers, disposers and/or States. In carrying out its study on
the financing, operation and management of the fund, the Secretariat was
required to address a number of outstanding questions listed in the An-
nex to the Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group.133 The contents of the
Annex included the basis on which to determine levies inposed on pri-
vate parties and on States; who should collect the levies; how collected
monies should be held pending transfer to the fund; who should maintain
and administer the fund; the accounting system required to run the fund;
the cost of administering the fund; how contributions should relate to the
amount of compensation to be provided; the expected average cost of an
incident covered by the protocol; the mechanisms and standards that
could be used to determine how and when funds should be dispensed and
the extent to which the fund should collect back the monies expended. 134
In trying to provide an efficient means of generating funds, States failed
to provide a system such as taxation of exports based on the "polluter
130. Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts to Develop Elements
Which Might Be Included in a Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Re-
sulting from the Transboundary Movement and Disposal of Hazardous Waste and Other
Wastes, U.N. Environment Programme, 2d Sess., U.N. Doe. WG.1/2/3 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts]. (This discusses the need for a com-
prehensive international liability regime with or without elements of State liability).
131. Id. at 5 n.3.
132. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 14, para. 2.
133. See Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts, supra note 130, at 9.
134. Id.
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pays" principle which would act as a disincentive to exporters of such
wastes. 13' Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject matter of
State liability and compensation, particularly the possibility of imposing
strict liability on States for damages resulting from hazardous waste ex-
port, it is likely that no final decision will be taken during the conference.
II. ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
Fully aware of the limited institutional, financial and technical capac-
ity of developing countries to implement the Basel Convention, member
States did not specify the time within which it should be implemented.
With limited technical, financial and institutional capacity, implementa-
tion at the domestic level, particularly for those in developing countries,
involves a gradual process. 136 Varying interpretations and diverging ex-
port programs in different countries slows down the pace of an effective
implementation process.
The language of the Basel Convention infers that the Secretariat was
intended to enhance the implementation of the Convention. 37 It is re-
quired, among other things, to act as a coordinator of activities and a
mediator. However, its activities are somewhat limited. For example,
the Convention states that: "[t]he functions of the Secretariat shall be
.. [t]o assist Parties upon request in their identification of cases of illegal
traffic and to circulate immediately to the Parties concerned any informa-
tion it has received regarding illegal traffic." 1 38
Concerned about the ability of the Secretariat and of developing coun-
tries with inadequate technical and financial capacity to moitor and to
prevent illegal toxic trade, Nigeria, on behalf of the developing countries,
unsuccessfully proposed that State parties should be obliged to cooperate
amongst themselves and with non-parties as well as NGOs in the dissem-
mation of information on the movement of vessels carrying such
wastes. 1 3 9 Unfortunately, most industrialized countries, including the
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136. For example, m some European countries, the implementation of EEC Directives
regulating the waste trade has been slow. Only four countries, Greece, Denmark,
Belgium and Italy, have implemented it at the domestic level. See JIM VALLETTE, THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WAsTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY (1989).
137. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 16.
138. Id. In addition, the Secretanat's functions include assisting the States upon re-
quest m such areas as the handling of the notification system, the management of wastes
and the monitoring of hazardous wastes and other wastes. Id. The Secretariat was in-
tended to act as a clearing house to receive information on a number of decisions taken by
States including steps to limit, ban and consent totally or partially to the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes. But in carrying out its functions, especially its monitor-
mg role, the Secretariat is required to act only on request. The provision would have
been more effective if the Secretariat could have acted on its own initiative.
139. Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical experts with a Mandate to Prepare
a Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes,
U.N. Environment Programme, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 6 at 12, U.N. Doc. WG.189/3
(1988).
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United States, blocked the incorporation of this proposal into the
Convention.
Therefore, the Convention has a weak implementation mechanism
which is aggravated by the failure of States to provide an effective means
of enhancing the technical and financial resources of developing coun-
tries. Without these resources, the goals of the Convention will justifia-
bly be perceived by States as mere aspirations which cannot be achieved.
Additionally, the enforcement provision through the International
Court of Justice is inadequate for failure to provide a mechanism
whereby individuals and environmental organizations can have locus
standi to enforce proceedings."4
Despite the dissatisfaction felt by States during the Basel negotiations,
some countries may attempt to comply with its provisions, to the extent
that it is consistent with the positions that they adopted during the nego-
tiations, while others might try to take advantage of its weaknesses to
justify noncompliance. In addition, noncompliance, like the question of
Implementation, could also stem from a lack of technical capacity and
not from a lack of will on the part of nations. States are sovereign and
there are no effective sanctions imposed upon them for failure to abide by
their obligations under the Convention. States might subscribe to trea-
ties as a result of a desire to appear cooperative without necessarily m-
tending to comply. Consequently, when it comes to implementing their
obligations, countries might find it inconvenient to do so and seek ways
of avoidance. However, States may still be motivated by public opinion
and moral pressures of the international community and the expectation
of reciprocity and comity to ensure compliance and implementation.
CONCLUSION
The Basel Convention is evidence of a positive step forward and the
first attempt by the international community to restrict the uncontrolled
trade in toxic waste and to ultimately eliminate such international trans-
actions. It has signaled the international resolve to eliminate the danger
that hazardous wastes pose to human health and to the environment.
T[he Convention has a number of strengths intended to enable States to
achieve the aim of restricting the international toxic trade. The strengths
include its provision for the following factors responsible for illegal traf-
fic: recognition of the sovereign right of States to decide whether or not
,to ban the toxic trade; and the requirement of prior informed consent,
,notification and response; requirement that the country of export ensure
I hat wastes disposed of are managed in an environmentally sound
Manner.
140. The Convention provides that if parties cannot settle their disputes through nego-
tiation or any other means, the dispute, if the parties to the dispute agree, shall be submit-
ied to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration under the conditions set out in
Annex VI on arbitration. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art. 20.
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In addition, the Convention has attempted to accommodate the con-
flicting interests of both developed countries, in ensuring a limited ban,
and of developing nations in incorporating the right to ban the toxic
trade.
As illustrated, although a total ban on the toxic trade, like the ban on
some commodities, may make the wastes more attractive in the illegal
international market and consequently result in smuggling, African
countries are justified in insisting on being accorded the right to ban the
trade in toxic poisons, especially since they lack the legal, financial, and
institutional capacity and technical know-how required to manage and
dispose of such wastes. With industrialization and population growth,
wastes are piling up fast in developing countries and as such, they have
enough difficulties with managing their own locally generated wastes that
they can hardly afford to cope with wastes from other countries.
Regardless of its strengths, the Basel Convention is bedeviled by a
number of loopholes and ambiguities which may hinder its effective ap-
plication and the achievement of its aims. Some of the ambiguities may
be deliberate. For example, the loophole created by the definition of haz-
ardous wastes was probably built into the Convention to allow for polit-
ical and scientific evolution of its definition and to allow States some
discretion in this area. However, some of the major pitfalls of the Con-
vention stem primarily from the failure of States to effectively deal with
some of the major underlying causes of the international toxic trade
problem, particularly key issues concerning:
-lack of effective regulatory and economic means of inducing consum-
ers (change in consumption patterns) and industries to reduce and to
prevent the quantity of wastes generated;
-inadequate technical and financial resources m developing countries;
-lack of stringent domestic environmental regulations in developing
countries;
-inadequate research and techical assistance in industrialized coun-
tries, to reduce the production of toxic wastes;
-failure of industrialized countries to provide effective toxic waste ex-
port controls;
-lack of environmental awareness in developing countries.
Therefore, the pitfalls of the Convention include the failure to provide
an effective information and monitoring system of identifying and keep-
ing track of the quantity and quality of wastes involved in the interna-
tional waste trade; lack of an effective international civil liability regime;
lack of a strong implementation and enforcement mechanism; usage of
the word "efficient" could be used by industrialized countries to justify
enormous shipment to developing countries thereby defeating the aim of
restricting the traffic to third world countries; 141 failure to provide an
effective means by which developing countries can strengthen their finan-
141. Basel Convention, supra note 35, art.4, para. 2(d), 9(a).
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cial, legal, technical and institutional capacity to implement the Conven-
tion; omission to define the meaning of "practical steps" with respect to
the disposal and management of wastes m an environmentally sound
manner; failure to provide an environmental education component par-
ticularly for those m developing countries; inadequate financial and tech-
nical capacity of the Secretariat whose functions have been restricted;
main emphasis on waste management/disposal rather than on the devel-
opment, promotion and enhancement of waste reduction and prevention
techniques; failure of States to require that countries, particularly indus-
trialized nations, provide more research support and devise technical,
economic and legal means to reduce waste production and lack of effec-
tive means of generating funds for compensating victims of damage re-
sulting from illegal traffic of toxic wastes.
Given the aforementioned pitfalls, countries, particularly African
countries, may be hindered from implementing the provisions of the
Convention in their decision to ban the toxic trade. Much work remains
within States before the ban can be effectively implemented, particularly
in African countries. In the meantime, developing countries should in-
troduce the following domestic measures: establish stringent and en-
forceable environmental regulations within their territories; increase the
level of environmental awareness of the public through wider and im-
proved methods of education; develop a sound system of exchanging in-
formation and scientific data between developed and developing
countries; and enhance institutional and technical capacity to monitor,
manage, and reduce the generation of wastes through training programs
and workshops organized for local personnel. These measures will be
achieved with the financial and technical support of international fund-
ing organizations like the World Bank and industrialized countries.
In turn, industrialized countries should introduce tighter regulations
to control the export of toxic wastes from their countries, particularly to
those countries that have banned its importation. As long as some indus-
tries have an easy escape valve, they will continue to make use of it.
Considering the rapid rate at which wastes are being generated not
only in industrialized countries but also in developing countries, intro-
ducing and implementing tight toxic waste export controls in industrial-
ized countries is not sufficient. The waste problem should be tackled at
its source and member States should develop legal, institutional and eco-
nomic means of inducing waste reduction and prevention, including con-
ducting more research on this subject.
International cooperation in this area of toxic waste trade is vital. An
international body consisting of techical experts from industrialized,
newly industrialized and developing countries should be established.
This body should be involved m the following activities: investigating
and providing technical support on issues concerning the establishment
of effective regulatory, technical and economic mechamsms of inducing
the reduction and prevention of toxic waste produced; monitoring and
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keeping track of the quantity and quality of all the wastes involved m the
international toxic trade; and tracking down illegal waste dealers and de-
termining the toxicity of the wastes that are exported.
The international liability regime should be modeled after the Umted
States CERCLA provisions. The regime should impose strict liability on
generators, transporters and past and present owners or operators of
toxic waste sites for the cost of remedial action and for damage resulting
from illegal dumping of wastes in developing countries.
To enhance the financial capacity of the recently established interna-
tional liability fund which is charged with the task of providing resources
for compensation in case of damage resulting from illegal waste traffic, an
efficient system of generating funds should be introduced including the
taxation of waste exports based on the polluter pays principle.

